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Introduction
This relatively thin but provocative volume discusses whether
evolutionary explanations (often from evolutionary psychol-
ogy) are useful in understanding some of life’s deepest issues,
including the foundations of ethics and religion. Each chapter
considers a new “Big Question.” At the end of each chapter,
David Stamos supplies his analysis, which often attempts to
overturn pre-Darwinian thinking. The book’s strength is its
breadth, and its weakness is its lack of depth on some rather
thorny issues. It is a stimulating book for students to read and
with supplementary additional readings serves successfully as
a text for an upper-level philosophy of biology class.
Evolution and Knowledge
Stamos begins his book by tackling the relationship between
evolution and knowledge. He describes how “Cartesian
Solipsism,” the dominant approach to epistemology in modern
philosophy, has become a large stumbling block, for it starts
with mind and sense data and “works its way out to the external
world” and for that reason is prone to skepticism. As a result of
this weakness, many contemporary philosophers have focused
their attention on modern science as an epistemological starting
point or have undertaken the study of naturalized epistemology.
Stamos is specifically interested in discussing the placement of
knowledge on an evolutionary foundation, his major topic of
focus for the first chapter.
Stamos considers two different approaches in evolutionary
epistemology. The first, championed by Michael Bradie,
“attempts to account for the cognitive mechanisms in animals
and humans through a straightforward extension of the theory
of evolution” (p. 16). The second considers the evolutionary
epistemology of theories, and attempts to explain the
evolution of ideas and scientific theories using models drawn
from evolutionary biology.
One of the more interesting and comprehensive parts of the
first chapter focuses on Karl Popper insofar as he is a founder
and leading advocate of “natural-selection epistemology.”
Stamos reviews Popper’s view of the emergence of life from
non-living things as well as the view that the mind gradually
evolved or emerged from living things. Popper thought of life
as first producing “closed behavioral programs” or rigid
DNA-based behavioral programs, and then, over time, natural
selection developed these closed processes into “open
behavioral programs” that were less rigid and open to more
diverse environments. Popper outlines four important steps in
the pathway from “open behavioral programs” to genuine
learning behavior. The first is direct trial-and-error behavior,
which encompasses the development of pain and pleasure.
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The second is “imagined trial-and-error behavior,” so that an
animal can use memory to play out scenarios in its mind and
avoid certain types of plants and animals without risking real
interaction with those organisms. The third step is the
formation of purposeful actions or ends, such as, hunting,
which encompasses most of the goal-seeking behavior of
higher animals. The last stage, found only in humans, is the
development of language that allows for the full analysis of
hypotheses in abstract, general ways. This foundation of
knowledge in trial-and-error elimination is a powerful idea,
and Stamos seems to be particularly encouraged about how
Popper’s naturalistic view links humans with the rest of the
animal world.
Stamos then considers several different aspects of the
human mind that appear to be non- or anti-truth seeking,
paying mind to the evolutionary reasons for self-deception,
stereotyping, herdmentality, and group think. He suggests that
because human minds developed epistemological features
along with anti-epistemological features, science has been
refined to be a system of checked inquiry adapted to facilitate
our truth-seeking tendencies and combat our anti-truth-
seeking tendencies.
The first chapter includes a brief critique of postmodern-
ism, which for Stamos is the view that everything is a matter
of perspective and interpretation and that there are no
privileged perspectives or interpretations in an epistemolog-
ical sense. Stamos felt that it was necessary to “point out what
was wrong” with postmodernist arguments. His main idea is
that if one dismisses logic and evidence to start with, no
amount of logic and evidence will be persuasive. If one gives
weight to power politics and motives as postmodernists do,
one will invariably commit ad hominum fallacies and lose the
power of argumentation to uncover truth. Stamos maintains
that, “when it comes to evolution and the big questions one
should make an inference to the best explanation on a case by
case basis, employing as much evidence and established
background theory as necessary, rather than getting caught up
on what should be the default position” (p. 42). This quote
appropriately sums up how he approaches the various topics
of the book.
Evolution of Consciousness and Language
In the second chapter of his book, Stamos considers the
evolution and the development of human consciousness.
Before discussing the central topic, he points out the
general challenge in understanding consciousness: it is a
characteristic that is only introspectively verified and
cannot be directly perceived in other individuals. Stamos
searches for a definition of consciousness, ultimately
coming to a conclusion that the best definition of
consciousness needs to explain something deeper than
simple language usage. He presents three competing views
regarding consciousness: (1) consciousness arose as a direct
adaptation resulting in improved reproductive success; (2)
consciousness is a byproduct of selection for another
characteristic; (3) consciousness is the work of a divine
entity that is impossible to explain through material
processes. Stamos begins by examining the case for
consciousness as a miracle by referencing the views of
Oxford theologian Richard Swinburne. He points out key
aspects of Swinburne’s views, beginning with the distinc-
tion between physical and mental events, from which
Swinburne concludes that there is no selective advantage
for having a mental life. Also, Swinburne claims that while
there can exist personal explanations of consciousness, to
understand the idea in its entirety can only be explained by
God. Stamos then details some problems with Swinburne’s
argument: notably, the complexity that the inclusion of God
generates, and Swinburne’s failure to understand the
evolutionary benefit of consciousness.
After presenting the case against divine intervention, it is a
little disappointing how minimally Stamos discusses the other
two views. He presents several interesting ideas about
consciousness, but often fails to directly relate them to a
specific view about the rise of consciousness through
evolution. Stamos discusses the relationship between con-
sciousness and language, most convincingly through his
consideration of the Wada test. This test shows that by
temporarily anesthetizing the known language center of the
brain, consciousness is apparently indistinguishable from
the ability to speak. Nonetheless, Stamos conceptually
disconnects consciousness from language development. He
does so by arguing for varying degrees of consciousness,
mentioning dream states and animal consciousness, as well
as quoting E.O. Wilson’s description of humankind as “the
babbling ape.” To further explain the idea of degrees of
consciousness, Stamos draws an analogy with eyes and
eyesight; he claims the eye originated in the animal
kingdom at least 40 times, and each instance has allowed
for different capabilities. So too there can be different
kinds of consciousness Stamos suggests.
Stamos’s chapter on evolution and language begins with
a description of the what evolutionary psychologists call the
“Standard Social Science Model” (SSSM), the view that the
brain is a “general purpose learning device,” capable of
learning a variety of languages. Evolutionary psychologists
tend to reject this view in favor of the mind as a set of
specific, dedicated, problem solving modules. The chapter
introduces the influential views of Noam Chomsky—that
the faculty of language is largely innate and “switches” that
change specific, superficial features of language are turned
either on or off by the environment. This “unconscious
knowledge” of language that is hard-wired into humans is
dubbed by Chomsky the universal grammar (UG).
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Though Chomsky himself resisted the notion that the UG
evolved by natural selection, Stamos begins to explore this
possibility by drawing on the work of Steven Pinker and
Derek Bickerton. Chomsky claims that the UG came about by
“true emergence” rather than traditional Darwinian natural
selection, but this claim is dubious because “the probability of
the UG and the right vocal anatomy resulting either from a
single mutation or a simultaneous combination of mutations is
vanishingly small” (p. 72). Stamos outlines Steven Pinker’s
five similarities between the human language and the trunk of
an elephant, citing their uniqueness, complexity, correlation
with large head/brain size, evolvability, and the existence of
proto- forms of each. Pinker’s view, then, is that natural
selection is indeed the best explanation of the emergence of
language users.
Bickerton similarly lays out an argument for the
emergence of language. A “cognitive explosion” occurred
nearly 120,000 years ago as a result of a tremendous
selective advantage conferred upon the species Homo
sapiens due to their successful, syntactical form of
protolanguage. He argues that “syntax could not possibly
work as a computational device unless its major defining
properties were intimately linked and had emerged simul-
taneously” (p. 86). The chapter’s central thesis is that the
human capacity for language seems best explained by
standard evolutionary principles, Chomsky’s views on UG
and Bickerton’s “creationist” views notwithstanding.
Evolution, Sexuality, and Gender
In chapter four, Stamos covers four topics: human mating,
incest, rape, and homosexuality, but for reasons of space, we
only consider the latter two. Stamos discusses rape and how it
might be explained, though by no means morally justified, by
evolutionary psychology. There are two evolutionary
approaches to rape: (1) it is an adaptation that increases
reproductive success, and (2) it is a byproduct of other
advantageous behaviors. Stamos largely dismisses the second
approach and focuses on the work of Michael Ghiglieri, who
favors the first approach. Ghiglieri uses statistics to show that
most rapists are of low socioeconomic status, an indicator of
low reproductive success, and to demonstrate how it might be
a condition-dependent trait. However, we think the byproduct
theory should not be tossed aside so quickly. A blended theory
is also possible. It could be that rape evolved as a byproduct of
successful qualities like assertiveness and strength, but is
activated by desperate conditions to ensure at least a chance at
reproductive success.
Homosexuality appears to be an anomaly in evolution,
as one would expect that homosexuals have lower
reproductive fitness and homosexual traits to be selected
against. Stamos presents three theories for the explanation
of the persistence of homosexuality. The first is kin
selection—that homosexuals are “altruistic” beings who
pass on their genes by increasing the reproductive fitness of
those most closely related. In order to confirm this theory,
one would need evidence that homosexuals have been more
altruistic than heterosexuals in the evolutionary past. The
second theory is that homosexuality is a byproduct of an X-
linked gene that increases the reproductive fitness of women
by making puberty occur earlier, but this view is controver-
sial even among geneticists. The third is that homosexuality
is a misplacement of sexuality. The example Stamos
provides to illustrate the third view is ancient Greek society,
where because women were closely protected men would
often turn to small boys for sex. Misplacement of sexuality
arguably explains the ancient Greek system; however,
homosexuality still exists in the present social structure,
which resembles little of Ancient Greece.
Chapter five covers the topic of evolution and feminism.
Stamos draws from the work of many authors, including
Simone de Beauvoir, Daphne Patai, Noretta Koertge, Alice
Rossi, Susan Okin, and Anne Fausto-Sterling. He explores
many different aspects of feminism, including the issues of
teaching extreme feminism to young female students and
how this affects the culture of feminism; the debate on
whether physical and behavioral differences of men and
women come from culture or biology; the is/ought gap;
Darwin’s theory of sexual selection and how it affects the
female mindset; the definitions of male, female, and
intersexual; and the myth of objective knowledge and
“malestream” science.
One of Stamos’s stronger arguments is against Okin’s
argument for the need to minimize gender differences. Okin
claims that gender is only a social and cultural construction
and that biological determinism should be rejected. She
suggests that for the sake of justice, starting with the family
and then working up through all of society, job and family
roles should be shared equally between men and women.
Stamos agrees that gender roles are somewhat flexible but
thinks that Okins’s suggestion is doomed to fail if there
nonetheless exist biologically based physical and behavior-
al differences between men and women. If it is true that
because of a long history of sexual selection there are
biological differences between genders, then the best hope
for justice in a 50/50 society would be to enact permanent,
gender-specific laws to counterbalance the effects of
evolution, which would in turn undermine the goal of
minimizing gender itself.
Stamos argues against Anne Fausto-Sterling’s view that
there are at least five “intersexes” and her view that we should
think of sexual dimorphism as merely a socially constructed
dichotomy. Fausto-Sterling suggests that complete maleness
and complete femaleness are just two opposing and extreme
sides of a gender continuum. She states that there are not just
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two genders, but an entire range of genders based on hormone
production and physical characteristics. Stamos counters that,
from an evolutionary perspective, an individual will only ever
naturally produce one kind of gamete, which is what defines
each gender. There are cases where an individual will develop
both male and female sexual characteristics due to an error in
gene expression, but the number of true intersex individuals is
less than 0.018% of the population.
Stamos’s argument is most tenuous when he extrapolates
the findings from a history of sexual selection in lions and
peafowl to the behavior of human males and females in
bars and internet dating websites. He uses the differences in
the way men and women look and act as an example of
where culture reflects biology. Peacocks and widowbirds
with large tail feathers will get mates more easily, and this
is why they have large tail feathers. On the other hand, men
and women are looking for someone specific based on their
interests, their situation, and desires. We maintain that this
is an example where some variation in dating styles is
merely cultural. It is quite likely that, unlike birds, not all
women are specifically looking for a mate expressly for
purposes of having and rearing children, and not all men
are looking for women to simply carry on their genes.
Are Human Races Real?
In chapter six, “Evolution and Race,” Stamos considers
various arguments concerning whether human races are real.
Can we consistently claim that human races don’t exist? He
claims that some of the pioneers of racial equality who argue
that the concept of human race is illegitimate are, in fact,
guilty of using groupings like “Australian Aborigine.” As he
puts it, “no sooner do they kick human races out the front
door, they let them in again through the back door” (p. 140).
He cites the ambiguity surrounding the concept of race as
the Achilles’ heel of the many biologists, anthropologists,
and philosophers who have tried to open the eyes of the
public to a world without races. Stamos attacks Richard
Hernnstein and Charles Murray’s work in The Bell Curve.
They attempt to show that IQ is heritable, using twin
studies, and that IQ is correlated with race. As race is
inherited, they conclude that racial differences in IQ are
inherited. Stamos argues that they err in their use of
heritability, which properly understood is defined only
relative to a specific population in a specific environment.
Change either the population or the environment and the
heritability of IQ can change. Nonetheless, Stamos suggests
that there is “nothing inherently mistaken or wrong headed,
let alone evil” in supposing there are racial differences in IQ.
For Stamos, racial equality is a moral imperative, not a
biological fact. He does not consider whether there are some
biological facts that should not be investigated.
Evolution of Ethics and Religion
In one of Stamos’s most controversial chapters, he consid-
ers the role evolution plays in ethics. He considers ideas
from John Alcock, Aristotle, Ruth Benedict, Jeremy
Bentham, Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, Thomas
Hobbes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John
Stuart Mill, G.E. Moore, Thomas Nagel, Plato, John Rawls,
W.D. Ross, Michael Ruse, Albert Schweitzer, Peter Singer,
Herbert Spencer, Paul Taylor, Robert Trivers, G.C. Wil-
liams, E.O. Wilson, and Peter Woolcock. Stamos’s ap-
proach is to contrast various thinkers against one another to
discover ethical truths and whether or not evolution can
provide any help.
He covers Social Darwinism, the naturalistic fallacy,
natural rights, social constructionism, social and selfish
instincts, psychological egoism, sociobiology, reciprocal
altruism, noncognitivism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and
deontology. He ultimately concludes that an absolute theory
of ethics is arbitrary and biased; and to avoid these
problems would require the principles of evolution to get
its feet off the ground; and that any useful, comprehensive
theory of ethics must be firmly planted in the realm of
evolutionary biology.
One of Stamos’s weakest points is an oversimplification
based on the “blind men and the elephant” parable to
describe how virtue ethics, psychological egoism, deontol-
ogy, utilitarianism, Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and environ-
mental and feministic ethics are simply just parts of a larger
normative ethics which has its grounding in evolution.
Admittedly it is just a parable, but most of these theories are
incompatible in a way that different parts of an elephant are
not, and Stamos says little about how one would avoid the
incompatibilities. On the other hand, he does end up
rejecting ethical absolutism, which may allow him to say
various otherwise incompatible ethical theories are all true
within restricted domains. This move would be a major
revision of standard views in normative ethics.
Stamos’ chapter on evolution and religion is arguably
the weakest in the book. While in previous chapters Stamos
is sometimes guilty of painting his opponents in broad
strokes, his ideas are typically coherent and plausible. In
this chapter, on the other hand, some of us believe that
Stamos is less convincing. His principle weakness is to
assume that “divine inspiration,” or the truthfulness of
religion must compete with evolution's capability to explain
it. He seems to assume that the explanation of religion
provided by evolutionary psychology implies that one
should believe in atheistic evolution.
As he puts it, “Atheistic evolution is simple (it is
completely down to earth and involves nothing supernatu-
ral), it is objective (it is not what one wants to believe), it is
internally and externally consistent with what is known in
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other sciences... it is fruitful... But is it testable?... atheistic
evolution is testable. At the genetic level alone, one can
conceive of observations that would refute it, such as, a
string of sequences in DNA that would be ridiculous to
explain by chance or by natural selection” (p. 200).
“Atheistic evolution” is arguably less simple than just
“evolution,” with nothing new to predict or contribute. As
for testability, his point is contestable. Using Ockham's
Razor and the inference to the best explanation, both of
which he uses to criticize others for beliefs that “don't
respect science,” one could argue that “atheistic evolution”
is at least as falsifiable as “evolution”; and therefore
evolution, being the simpler theory, can be inferred as
superior to “atheistic evolution.” Additionally, Stamos’s
claim that “theistic evolution” isn't falsifiable and therefore
“atheistic evolution” is better science is also questionable.
If evolution is found to be false, theistic evolution is
falsified, and hence if evolution is falsifiable so is “theistic
evolution.”
In the final chapter of the book, “Evolution and the
Meaning of Life,” Stamos discusses the meaning of life from
an evolutionary standpoint. He examines the compatibility of
evolutionary biology and existentialism in addition to trying
to answer the questions of “whether evolution adds any
meaning to life, takes away from it, or has no relevance” and
“whether we have a basic need, evolved instinctual need, to
find meaning of our lives” (p. 215). As in earlier chapters,
Stamos takes the viewpoint of evolutionary biology. Argu-
ably, evolution gives humans little choice but to keep playing
the game of survival and reproduction. Following later
Richard Dawkins, Stamos suggests that science does not rob
the world of meaning, but rather fuels our sense of awe at its
grandeur. In the most interesting argument of the chapter,
Stamos follows Robert Nozick and argues that the meaning of
life is relative to each individual and that one should strive to
be connected to other people and things, and that humans can
seek the meaning of life through the pursuit of knowledge or
through personal relationships. The chapter ends with Stamos
arguing that it does not really matter if the universe has a
meaning or not, but that evolution has bestowed us with the
ability to perform logic and appreciate the fallacy of division.
Just because the universe as a whole does not have meaning, it
does not follow that no individual person has a meaningful
life. What is wrong with existentialism and the SSSM is that
they both rely on false conceptions of human nature.
Evolutionary thinking suggests that human nature is well
described by “statistical norms,” and we are not utterly free as
Sartre thought, nor do we start as a blank slate as one reading
of SSSM asserts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this book is definitely worth a read, and
Stamos successfully shows how evolutionary thinking has a
bearing on the “Big Questions.” Aside from weaknesses,
which come with covering a vast amount of ground in a
slim volume, this book is well worth the time and serves as
an excellent introduction to the wide-ranging implications of
human evolutionary psychology as seen by a philosopher.
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